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The Interaction of Child-labour and Schooling  






This paper analyses the interaction between child labour and schooling in developing 
countries. A theoretical framework is developed, where fertility and schooling decisions are made 
in an environment where children contribute through child labour when young and provide 
old-age security as adults. The model demonstrates that the child wage rate, which is also the 
opportunity cost of schooling, is a crucial determinant of total fertility. An increase in the child 
wage rate leads to lower schooling investments and higher fertility levels. However, changes in 
schooling costs have no impact on fertility decisions. They only affect the allocation of children’s 





In developing countries, children make substantial contributions to household income 
through child labour and also act as important sources of old-age security. Children’s 
contributions in rural areas may include performing household tasks such as tending cattle, 
collecting firewood, taking care of younger siblings, fetching water and helping with cooking. 
They may also be employed in the urban informal sector.
1 The ILO estimates that there are 
approximately 120 million children in the age group of 5-14 who work on a full-time basis, 
and this figure rises to around 200 million including those for whom work is a secondary 
activity. Further, surveys conducted by the ILO find that over a twelve-month period, the 
proportion of economically active children in the age group 5-14 years could be as high as 40 
per cent. These studies find that children’s labour contributions are an important component 
of household income, in some cases amounting to around one-third of the household income 
(Lansky (1997)). 
Similarly, children are also regarded as sources of financial and emotional security in 
parents’ old-age, particularly in areas where the joint family system is common. Moreover, 
financial and labour market imperfections combined with a lack of state sponsored social 
security programs creates an uncertainty about the asset accumulation required for old-age. 
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Under these circumstances, children help in filling the gaps left by market failures.
2 
These two economic benefits from children are however linked, as parents face a 
trade-off between present and future consumption. For instance, greater child labour 
contributions are consistent with a lower potential for future financial benefits from children. 
However, despite the scale of child labour in developing countries, the fertility literature has 
ignored the effect of child labour contributions on fertility decisions. For instance, Becker 
(1960), Becker and Lewis (1973), Becker and Barro (1991) treat children as consumption 
goods only. In these models, fertility decisions depend on parental income and the 
opportunity cost of child- rearing. Similarly, studies by Willis (1980), Nugent (1985), Razin 
and Sadka (1995) focus mainly on their old-age security contributions and current economic 
benefits from children are ignored.
3 
In this paper, I propose a theoretical framework that incorporates fertility, consumption 
and education decisions in a model where there is a child labour market. Although there are 
many factors that potentially influence fertility decisions, the approach taken here is 
consistent with several stylised facts from developing countries. 
First, children make important economic contributions to their parents, both in their 
young age and as adults. Second child rearing costs are typically low in developing countries. 
As women work extensively in the rural sector, the production process is labour intensive 
and child labour is frequently used (Dasgupta (1993, 1995)). Women have a low opportunity 
cost of time, as they are more likely to be employed in the informal sector where child-care 
is compatible with their work (see Oppong (1982), Mueller (1976)). In addition there are 
opportunities for informal child-care in the form of relatives and friends. 
Finally, a number of empirical studies show a trade-off between child labour and 
schooling. These include Nielsen (1998), Jensen and Nielsen (1997) and Mason and 
Khandker (1998) for evidence from Africa. Studies by Psacharapoulos (1997) and Patrinos 
and Psacharopoulos (1997) find evidence of a child labour-schooling trade-off in Latin 
America. From these studies it is evident that if children are desired for their child labour 
benefits, there is little incentive for households to invest in their schooling because of its 
associated opportunity cost. Therefore households with more educated children are also 
likely to have fewer children.   
Two important results are derived from this model. First, the child wage rate is shown 
to be an important determinant of fertility whereas factors such as returns to schooling do not 
affect fertility decisions. Second, higher schooling costs lead to a substitution away from 
schooling towards child labour. From a policy perspective, the model raises important issues. 
It shows the conditions under which fertility levels may be at their biological maximum and 
there is no investment in children’s schooling. This happens for example, if marginal child 
benefits are greater than marginal child rearing costs. An important policy implication then is 
 
2. In Asia, the old-age security hypothesis is supported in studies by Cain (1991), Jensen (1990) and Vlassoff (1990). 
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(Nugent and Gillaspy (1983)). 
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that a decrease in the child wage rate, accompanied by compensation for loss of child labour 
income, may be a powerful policy combination in fertility and child labour reduction 
programs. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces the theoretical 
structure that examines the interaction between child labour and schooling decisions. The 
main implications of the model are analysed in Sections III and IV. Section III examines the 
comparative static properties of the model with respect to changes in the child wage rate in 
III.1 and changes in the price of schooling in Section III.2. Corner solutions are discussed in 
Section IV, and the conclusions are presented in Section V.   
 
II. The Model 
 
The model economy consists of parents and children. Parents are self-interested in the 
sense that consumption is the only direct source of utility. Suppose individuals live for three 
periods- childhood, middle and old age. Childhood is a period when individuals acquire their 
human capital through the decisions made by their parents. During their middle years, they 
work, make transfer payments to their parents and make decisions on fertility, child labour 
and schooling investments. In their last period, they are retired and consume the old-age 
transfers made by their children. When children become adults they go through the same 
cycle as their parents. Therefore, individuals only make economic decisions when they are 
middle-aged.   
Under ILO’s classification, the employment of children  in the age group of 5-14 
constitutes child labour. It seems reasonable to assume that young children in this age group 
do not have any bargaining power over their parents. Therefore parents make decisions on 
their children’s time allocation and the model argues that children cannot bargain or make 
decisions on time-allocation until they reach their middle-age.
4 
Let  l n n n s u + + = ~  where  n ~   refers to total child hours,  1 n  and  s n  refer to child 
hours spent in labour and schooling respectively and l refers to total leisure hours. Assuming 
that leisure hours are a fixed proportion of  n ~ , then the decision variables are  1 n  and  s n . 
Hence, fertility is proportional to child non-leisure hours defined as  s u n n n + = .
5 Further 
assume  0 , 0 ‡ ‡ s u n n  and  n n n s u £ + £ 0 , where  n  is the maximum number of non- 
leisure hours associated with the biological maximum number of children. 
Thus the representative agent chooses  u n  and  s n  at time t, in order to maximise the 
following utility function, 
 








t t t c u c u V ,                                                 (1) 
 
4.  The collective model of bargaining is appropriate, for example, in a setting where we examine bargaining 
between spouses where each spouse has an outside option.   
5. An increase in total child hours is the same as an increase in total child numbers, assuming that total leisure hours 
per child is constant and the length of the working day is also constant. Hence total child hours may be 24 hours 
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where the subscripts denote time of birth and the superscripts denote the time of 
consumption. Thus, 
t




























t n g c t .                                                       (3) 
 
Equation (2) is the parent’s budget constraint when they are of working age. Adult i’s 
income flow  (.) g , depends on schooling investments 
i
st n 1 -  made by their parents in period 
tꎭ1. The consumption of the middle-aged generation is financed through two sources. This 
includes their schooling returns net of transfers made to elderly parents,  ) 1 )( ( 1 t st n g t - - , and 
the wage contributions of their working children, 
t
ut tn w . Children’s labour income at time t 
depends on the exogenously given child wage rate w and child hours in the labour force,  1 n . 
Children that spend time in the labour force are presumed to be unskilled and contribute all 
their child wage earnings to parental income. The proportion of earnings that is transferred to 
their old parents is  t , which is assumed to be exogenously determined by social norms. 
The term  ) (n f  represents the child rearing cost function. Child rearing costs include 
resource costs such as expenditures on food, education and medicine. In addition parents also 
incur time costs in raising children. Therefore, the child rearing cost function implicitly 
includes both parental time and r esource inputs into child rearing. As discussed above, 
leisure time per child is constant, and so total leisure time increases with the number of 
children. Hence, child rearing costs are an increasing function of total child hours. Further it 
is assumed that  0 1 > f  and  0 11 > f , due to the fact that there are also fixed input costs in 
child rearing.   
Parents also incur schooling resource costs h, on child hours spent in schooling. These 
costs include the direct financial costs incurred by parents on tuition fees, books, cost of 
travel, and so on. 
Equation (3) is the constraint faced by parents in their old age. In period t+1, each 
adult is retired and consumes transfers  1 + t t , from their children, which is a function of their 
children’s schooling returns,  (.) g . The direct schooling costs such as expenditure on tuition 
fees, transportation, uniforms, books etc, increase with each additional child that is sent to 
school. They increase with each additional child that is sent to school. Diminishing returns 
sets in because of fixed inputs of parent’s time and resources such as land and income. 
Therefore it is assumed that  0 , 0 11 1 < > g g . 
Assume that the utility function is additively separable and let  0 , 0 11 1 < > u u . Parents 
choose the number of child hours to allocate to child labour and schooling, with the aim of 
maximising utility over their lifetime. As there are no financial markets, individuals attain 
optimal inter-temporal consumption smoothing only through children.   
Substituting (2) and (3) in (1), individual’s utility maximisation corresponds to the 
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st n n n g u h n n f n w n g u
ut st t f t ,                 (4) 
 
where  0 1 ‡ + t t , and  t w  and  t h  are exogenous parameters for all  t. Utility maximisation 
with respect to  ut n  and  st n  yields the following first-order conditions, 
 
0 )] ( [ ) ( 1 1 = - = ¢
t t ut n f w u n V   if  0 > > ut n n ; 
0 £   if  0 = ut n ; 
0 ‡  if  n nut = ,                                   ( 5) 
 
0 ] (.) [ )] ( [ ) ( 1 1 2 1 1 = + + - = ¢
+ t t t st g u n f h u n V t  if  ; 0 > > st n n  
0 £  if  ; 0 = st n  
0 ‡  if  n nst = .                       (6) 
 
Define the steady-state to be a situation where  st st st n n n = = + - 1 1  and  ut ut ut n n n = = + - 1 1 . 
Hence in a steady-state the model reduces to a two-period model. We restrict attention to 
steady-state solutions and drop the time-subscripts for notational convenience. Since we are 
interested in poor developing countries, where there is a persistence of high fertility and child 
labour levels along with low schooling investments, these parameters do not change. As the 
steady state is more relevant under these circumstances, for the rest of the paper, the analysis 
is conducted in terms of a two-period model. 
From (5) at an interior optimum child labour hours are determined by the condition 
) ( 1 s u n n f w + = . Thus optimal child l abour hours are determined at the point where the 
marginal benefits from child labour (w), equal the marginal cost ( 1 f ) of an additional child. 
This condition also determines total fertility levels  ) ( s u n n n + = .   
Equation (6) characterises the optimal level of human capital investment. Thus in an 
equilibrium: 
 








= .                                                      (7) 
 
Accordingly, an interior solution is characterised by the tangency between “full prices” 
and the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the respective periods. The full 
price of schooling in children includes both the monetary cost (h) and the opportunity cost of 
human capital investment (w). An increase in schooling costs or a decrease in the discounted 
marginal returns to schooling leads to a fall in 
2 1,C C MRS . 
 
III. Analysis of the Model: Comparative Statics 
 
The comparative static results (See Appendix) show that changes in the child wage 
rate effect both child labour and schooling decisions. While the child wage rate represents JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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direct benefits from child labour, it is also the opportunity cost of schooling. Hence, w has an 
ambiguous effect on choice variables  u n  and  s n . 
 
III.1. Changes in the Child Wage Rate 
 
Consider first the impact on child labour of changes in the child wage rate,  w nu ¶ ¶ . 








U f h n C u U C u u 12 1 1 11 22 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( - - + - >
<  0                             (8) 
 
and the cross-price effect of a change in the child wage rate on child schooling is given by: 
 
J
C u U f h n C u U
w




< 0 .                           (9) 
 
In Equations (8) and (9), the terms  22 U  and  12 U  are the second- order partial 
derivatives of (5) and (6) with respect to  s n  and  u n  respectively, both of which are 
negative. However, the effect of a change in the child wage rate on child labour and child 
schooling is ambiguous. Below we analyse three possible ways in which changes in the child 
wage rate may affect child labour and schooling decisions. First, an increase in the child 
wage rate reduces demand for child hours in schooling, but increases the supply of child 
labour. Second, child schooling and labour hours may both rise. Third, schooling hours may 
increase whereas child labour hours may fall. Each of these cases is analysed below. 
 
Case 1: Suppose  w nu ¶ ¶ > 0 and  w ns ¶ ¶ < 0. From (5) total fertility level,  s u n n n + =  
must increase if w rises, so  w n ¶ ¶ > 0. Thus  w nu ¶ ¶  must be greater than  w ns ¶ ¶ . 
 
From (A.7 in the Appendix)  w nu ¶ ¶  > 0 if 
 
12 1 1 11 22 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( U f h n C u U C u u + > -                                        (10a) 
 
and from (A.8)  w ns ¶ ¶  < 0 if 
 
11 1 1 11 21 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( U f h n C u U C u u + > - .                                      (10b) 
 
Note that the RHS of (10a) and (10b) are identical because  11 12 U U = . It is also known 
(See the Appendix) that  21 22 U U > , so if (10b) holds then (10a) must also hold. Thus (10b) 
is a sufficient condition for Case 1. The direction of the inequality in (10a) indicates either 
that the marginal utility of period 1 income,  ) ( 1 1 C u , is relatively high, or that child costs, 
) ( 1 f h+  are relatively low. Intuitively, at low levels of period one consumption, the RAMMOHAN: THE INTERACTION OF CHILD-LABOUR AND SCHOOLING 
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opportunity cost of schooling in terms of forgone period one consumption is high. Hence, for 
an increase in the child wage rate, there is a substitution away from schooling towards higher 
child labour. From these results follow: 
 
Proposition 1: If (10b) holds, then a rise in the child wage rate (i) increases total fertility (ii) 
leads to a decline in child hours in schooling, and (iii) increases child hours in the labour 
force. 
 
Part (i) follows directly from (5) since  ) ( 1 s u n n f w + = . Thus, for a given child-rearing 
cost function  ) (n f , the child wage rate alone determines total fertility levels. To see this, 
consider a situation where parents wish to increase children’s schooling hours either by 
substituting out of child labour or by having more children. However note that  0 11 > f , 
hence if child schooling hours increase, marginal child rearing costs must rise as well. Since 
the wage rate is determined exogenously, child numbers will not change. Thus an increase in 
child schooling is only possible by substituting away from child labour. As shown before, it 
is not possible for both child labour and schooling hours to fall when the child wage rate 
rises. In other words,  w nu ¶ ¶ <0 and  w ns ¶ ¶ < 0 cannot happen because  21 22 U U > . 
Now consider the alternative possibility. 
 
Case 2: If both  0 > w nu ¶ ¶  and  0 > w ns ¶ ¶ , then an increase in the child wage rate 
raises total fertility levels. 
 
This condition holds if in addition to (10a) it is also the case that 
 
11 1 1 11 21 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( U f h n C u U C u u + < - .                                      (10c) 
 
This solution holds for intermediate values of  ) ( 1 1 C u . Finally consider Case 3 below, 
 
Case 3: For  0 < w nu ¶ ¶  and  0 > w ns ¶ ¶  to hold, a sufficient condition is that 
22 1 1 12 1 1 11 ) ( ) ( ) ( U C u U f h n C u u - > + . This also implies (10c) because  21 22 U U > . From these 
results follow: 
 
Proposition 2: If child rearing costs are relatively high then a rise in the child wage rate 
implies: (i) an increase in child hours in schooling and (ii) a decline in child hours in the 
labour force. Alternatively, w nu ¶ ¶ < 0 and  w ns ¶ ¶ > 0. 
 
If child rearing costs are high, then the marginal utility of period one consumption 
must be low. Under these conditions, parents do not require children’s labour income to 
increase current consumption. Therefore total fertility n does not rise in this case, making it 
similar to the Becker model. This comparative static result, however, seems more relevant to 
developed countries. In these countries child rearing costs both in terms of resources and 
parental time cost are high.   JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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What are the implications of these results in the context of developing countries? The 
comparative static results with regard to changes in the child wage rate are summarised in the 
three cases above. The most interesting situation from a developing country’s perspective is 
Case 1, where a rise in the child wage rate implies a substitution towards more child labour 
hours (and hence more unskilled children). Fertility levels increase in t his case. In 
developing countries, low incomes mean that marginal utility of period one consumption 
) ( 1 1 C u , is likely to be relatively high and hence consumption levels are relatively low. On the 
other hand, since women’s opportunity cost of time and schooling costs are low,  ) ( 1 f h+  
are also low. Under such conditions, small changes in the child wage rate lead to higher child 
labour hours and consequently we observe a decline in child schooling levels. This result is 
different from Becker’s model where the emphasis is on parental opportunity cost of time. 
Hence in that model an increase in the (adult) wage rate leads to a substitution towards more 
skilled children. Importantly, as Case 2 and Equation (5) demonstrate, an increase in the 
child wage rate always raises total fertility. 
Finally, Case 3 is the only one where child labour hours fall in response to a rise in the 
child wage rate. Thus, in an institutional setting where child labour is prevalent, the only 
situation when child labour hours do not increase in response to a rise in the child wage rate 
is if both consumption levels and child costs are relatively high. From this we can deduce 
that income levels must be high so that parents do not need their children’s labour income to 
increase period one consumption. 
These results also have implications for schooling investments, since a rise in the child 
wage rate increases children’s schooling only under very restrictive conditions. It requires 
either that child costs or consumption levels be low. Empirically studies by Rosenzweig and 
Evenson (1977), Kanbargi and Kulkarni (1991), and Vemuri and Sastry (1991), attribute a 
rise in fertility and child labour levels to an increase in the child wage rate. It is this aspect 
that policy makers should be concerned about, particularly in those countries that are 
characterised by low levels of schooling investment. 
 
III.2. Changes in Price of Schooling 
 
The next comparative static exercise is to consider the effect of a change in h on child 
labour and schooling. From the conjugate-pairs theorem, the parameter h only enters the 
first-order condition with respect to  s n  with a negative sign. Hence, an increase in 
schooling costs,  h, unambiguously reduces schooling investments. These results are 
summarised in Proposition 3 below: 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in schooling costs reduces the demand for child hours in 
schooling and leads to higher child labour hours, its substitute. That is,  0 < h ns ¶ ¶ ; 
0 > h nu ¶ ¶ . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. RAMMOHAN: THE INTERACTION OF CHILD-LABOUR AND SCHOOLING 
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A rise in schooling costs has the same effect as a decline in the household’s budget. 
Hence the own-price effect of an increase in h, leads to a reduction in child schooling hours, 
s n . The higher demand for  u n  is met by substituting away from  s n  as children’s time in 
schooling and labour are considered to be substitutes. This result is also consistent with 
empirical studies from developing countries which find that a decline in the cost of child 
schooling or health (in the form of greater availability of schools and medical facilities), 
raises child schooling hours. Indeed low schooling enrolment in developing countries is often 
attributed to the high cost of schooling (see studies by Duraisamy and Malathy (1991), 
Rosenzweig and Evenson ( 1977), Rosenzweig (1990)). As decisions on child schooling 
hours are unilaterally imposed on the child, it represents an intergenerational externality to 
the child. If parents were completely altruistic and cared about their children’s welfare, they 
might allocate the right amount of schooling. Therefore there is a missing market in 
schooling allocation across generations.   
 
IV. Corner Solutions 
 
Cross-sectional studies from several developing countries show that there are positive 
economic returns to high fertility in poor areas of developing countries (Cain  (1991), 
Caldwell  (1982), Boserup (1984)). In environments where children are valued as assets, 
increasing the number of children helps in achieving the twin objectives of higher current 
period income and also greater old-age security. Thus, households may choose to have their 
biological maximum number of children (Caldwell  (1982), Clay and Vander Haar  (1993), 
Sharif and Saha ( 1993)). In the context of developing countries these include situations 
where parents either have the biological maximum number of children,  n , or do not educate 
any of their children. 
Using Equations (5) and (6) we discuss below four possible corner solutions. Consider 
first a situation where marginal child benefits are greater than marginal child-rearing costs, 
1 f w > . With each additional child, the rise in total child benefits is greater than the increase 
in child costs. This condition implies that fertility levels are at their biological maximum and 
all the children are employed in child labour activities, so that  n nu = . As a sub-set of the 
above condition, consider the following two possibilities. First suppose, 
 
1 f w >  and  ) ( 1 1 f h g + > t .                                           (11a) 
 
In this case in addition to higher net marginal benefits from children in the first period, 
net returns from educating children are also greater than the costs. However, it is not clear 
from this condition if parents choose to send more children to school or to the labour force. 
Alternatively consider, 
 
1 f w >  and  ) ( 1 1 f h g + < t .                                           (11b) 
 
These conditions imply that total benefits from child labour are higher than the cost of 
child rearing and in addition, returns to schooling investments are low relative to their costs. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Hence there is no incentive for households to invest in the schooling of their children. 
Therefore, 
min
s s n n =  and  n nu = . The term 
min
s n  refers to minimum child schooling hours. 
However since children are endowed with some minimum human capital even if they do not 
go to school, we assume that although this is close to zero, it is not zero. This ensures that 
period two consumption is still positive. It is also the most interesting case from a policy 
point of view particularly for developing countries with population problems. When parental 
decisions on schooling are motivated by their own utility, there is the possibility of low 
investment in schooling from society’s point of view. 
Now consider the least likely cases in the context of developing countries. This 
includes a situation where  1 f w< . Here total child costs are greater than child benefits, 
hence parents are at a corner where  0 = u n . Suppose however that,  1 f w<  and  ) ( 1 1 f h g + < t . 
In this case, total child costs are greater than child benefits and therefore parents have no 
children,  0 = = s u n n .   
Alternatively consider the possibility that,  1 f w<  and  ) ( 1 1 f h g + > t . If this happens, 
total benefits from children in period one (child labour benefits) are less than their costs, 
hence  0 = u n . However, since net returns from schooling are greater than their costs, parents 
educate all their children and  max s s n n =  where  n ns £ max  refers to maximum child schooling, 
which may be less than or equal to the biological maximum.   
Thus if the child wage rate is high, this may result in a corner solution where fertility is 
at its maximum level and all children are employed in child labour levels. These results 
indicate that from a policy perspective, human capital development and fertility reduction 




In this paper a theoretical framework is developed where the interaction between child 
labour and schooling determines fertility levels. The model is relevant to developing 
countries, where schooling and fertility decisions are often made in an environment where 
children contribute to household income through child labour and also provide for their 
parents’ old-age security. The paper highlights an aspect of the literature that has been 
extensively discussed in empirical studies but has received very little theoretical attention.   
It is shown that changes in the child-wage rate affect fertility, child labour and 
schooling decisions. In poor households characterised by high marginal utility of period one 
consumption, an increase in the child wage rate leads to higher fertility levels as households 
employ more children in the labour force. As the child wage rate is also the opportunity cost 
of schooling, this leads to a decline in schooling investments. However, changes in schooling 
costs do not affect fertility decisions, but only affect the child labour-schooling allocation. 
The model shows that a rise in schooling costs leads to lower levels of schooling, and higher 
levels of child labour.   
The analysis also discusses possible corner solutions. If the child wage rate is 
relatively high, and child rearing costs and returns from educating children are relatively low, 
then fertility may reach the biological maximum with no investment in schooling. 
From a policy perspective, the model raises several interesting issues. The model RAMMOHAN: THE INTERACTION OF CHILD-LABOUR AND SCHOOLING 
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demonstrates that in situations where income from child labour forms an integral part of the 
household income, fertility and schooling decisions are also affected by changes in the child 
wage rate. Therefore, a reduction in the child wage rate along with compensation for parents 
affected by the loss in children’s labour income, can serve as useful tools in fertility and 
child labour reduction programs. Moreover, efforts to expand schooling opportunities should 
also take into consideration its interaction with child labour, and the possibility that 





This mathematical appendix describes the second-order conditions and derives the 
comparative static results essential to prove the propositions. 
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The second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied if, 
 
0 , 0 , 0
2
12 22 11 22 11 > - < < U U U U U . 
 
From (A.3)  t r t r ) )( ( ) )( ( ) )( ( ) )( ( 11 2 1
2
1 2 11 11 1 1
2
1 1 11 22 g C u g C u f C u f h C u U + + - + - - = < 0, 
since  0 11< g .  0 11 < U  because  0 11 > f . The Jacobian,  J , for the interior first-order 






J = , 
 
which is positive as the second-order sufficient conditions are satisfied. 
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2. Comparative Statics 
 
a. Changes in Wages 
 
Totally differentiating Equations (6) and (7) with respect to  s u n n ,   w and h, we get: 
 
dw f w n C u C u dn U dn U u s u )] ( ) ( ) ( [ 1 1 11 1 1 12 11 - + + +  
, 0 ] ) )( ( [ 1 1 11 = - - + dh n f w C u s                                          (A.4) 
 
dw f h n C u dn U dn U u s u )] ( ) ( [ 1 1 11 22 21 - - + +  
0 )] ( ) ( ) ( [ 1 1 1 1 11 = - - - - + dh C u f h n C u s .                                  (A.5) 
 

























































U f h n C u U C u u 12 1 1 11 22 1 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( - - + -
  >
< 0.                         (A.7) 
 
In Equation (A.7),  ) ( 1 1 C u  is the marginal utility of consumption in period 1, which is 
positive.  22 U  is negative for an interior solution.  u n C u ) ( 1 11 , which is the change in marginal 
utility of consumption in period 1 multiplied by the number of children in child labour, is 
negative since  0 ) ( 1 11 < C u . Child cost in period 1,  ) ( 1 f h- -  is also negative.  0 11 12 < = U U . 
The sign of the numerator is therefore ambiguous given the positive Jacobian determinant in 





< (>) 0. 
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< 0.                      (A.8) 
 
In (A.8), the sign of the numerator is ambiguous since  ) ( 1 11 C u < 0.  11 U  and  21 U  are 
negative as is  ) ( 1 f h- - . 
 
b. Proof of Proposition 3 
 
From (A.4) and (A.5) we get 
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so using Cramer’s rule, 
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